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This paper argues that a neglected but significant effect of inflation is the
disruption of the way firms conduct business. Evidence on actual transac-
tion prices is used to illustrate how far actual market behavior differs
from that predicted by simple supply equal to demand models. A theory
is presented that accounts for the evidence and links together liquidity of
markets, product heterogeneity, price rigidity and quantity rationing,
and firm size. The concluding section applies the theory to analyze the
effects of inflation and presents data on the effects of inflation. The paper
concludes that inflation has forced firms to rely on more liquid markets,
to use more standardized products, and to make greater use of prices to
allocate goods than they would have without inflation.
6.1 Introduction
Inflation has plagued the United States economy since the late 1960s. I
use the word "plagued" because there seems to be a unanimous senti-
ment that inflation is bad. There is much less agreement among econo-
mists as to why inflation is bad. This paper discusses what I believe to be a
neglected but significant effect of inflation, namely the disruption of
well-established methods of transacting business.
1 Because of this effect,
inflation can cause dramatic and undesirable changes in the types of
goods that get sold and in the structure of markets.
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The next section reports on the pattern of transaction prices found in a
sample of businesses during a relatively noninflationary period, 1957-66.
These data enable us to learn how businessmen like to structure their
transactions and emphasize how far actual market behavior deviates from
that predicted by a naive textbook model in which price continuously
adjusts so as to keep supply equal to demand. Motivated by the empirical
findings of section 6.2, section 6.3 sketches the general theory of the close
relation between the organization of markets, the size and structure of
firms in the industry, and the transactional arrangements used by busi-
ness. Section 6.4 uses this theory to discuss and present evidence on the
impact of inflation on markets and firm structures.
6.2 Evidence on How Actual Markets Work
One of the first lessons an economics student learns is that the competi-
tive price of a homogeneous product is determined by the intersection of
a supply and demand curve. This very simple model predicts that price
should be continuously changing in response to changes in supply and
demand. The model also presumes a highly liquid market in the sense
that any buyer can buy and any seller can sell at any time at the known
market price. Since there is a single market price, all buyers' prices
change simultaneously when either demand or supply changes. Price is
the sole mechanism used to allocate goods to buyers.
Economists recognize that this simple model may not provide an
accurate description of how all markets operate. In fact, markets differ
greatly in how well their behavior conforms to that predicted by the
simple model. At one extreme are highly liquid markets, like organized
exchanges (e.g., New York Stock Exchange), where transactions can
take place almost instantaneously at the market price, which is deter-
mined at each moment by the interactions of many potential buyers and
sellers. At the other extreme are highly illiquid markets where the good
that is transacted has attributes customized to the individual transaction
between the buyer and seller and where there is no continuously available
"market price" quoted because each transaction involves a unique good.
To determine how close the behavior of any market is to that predicted
by the simple supply equal to demand model, it is necessary to examine
the behavior of transaction prices in that market. We examine transaction
prices during the period 1957-66. This period was characterized by
relatively low rates of inflation. The data, collected by James Kindahl and
George Stigler, report the transaction prices paid by buyers for various
goods usually on a monthly basis for the ten-year period 1957-66.
2 The
buyers provided practically all the price information. The buyers were
composed primarily of large companies, but also included hospitals and
federal, state, and local governments.141 Disruptive Effect of Inflation on the Organization of Markets
Table 6.1 lists by product the average duration of price inflexibility in
months and the standard deviation of duration. The calculations are
based on the total number of spells during which the transaction price
between a particular buyer and seller remains unchanged. (For each
observed pairing of buyer and seller, there is a price series reflecting the
actual transaction prices paid over time. Since a buyer typically continues
to do business with the same seller after a price change, each pairing of a
buyer and seller produces a price series with several spells during which
the transaction price is unchanged.)
Table 6.1 is based on an interpolation of the price series. The main
assumptions underlying the interpolation are that when data are missing
(most relevant when a series is reported only every three months) then if
the price is unchanged between reports it is assumed constant between
reports. If the price changes between reports, we assume only one price
change. This method creates an upward bias in estimated rigidity, though
examination of some complete data series appears to indicate that the
bias is not sufficiently important so as to alter the inferences to be made
from table 6.1.
Several facts are striking about table 6.1. First, it is evident that for
many transactions between individual buyers and sellers, price once set
tends to remain unchanged for substantial periods of time (over one year
in many cases). This fact suggests that quantity allocations (e.g. ration-
ing) and not price may be the mechanism used to allocate some goods
when supply or demand changes. Presumably, the seller's personal
knowledge about the demander's needs will influence the allocation.


























































a"Number of contracts" means the number of price series between individual buyers and
sellers for a good of specified characteristics.142 Dennis W. Carlton
Second, for any one product, the standard deviation of length of rigidity
is quite high. This suggests that for any one product there are a wide
variety of contracts with differing price flexibility. In other words, it
appears from table 6.1 that there are some contracts that have very
flexible prices while others have very inflexible prices for the same broad
commodity group. This suggests (and more detailed studies confirm) that
the correlation of price movements among different contracts for the
same type of commodity need not be very close. We expect that the goods
whose prices are flexible are more standardized in their characteristics
than the goods whose prices are inflexible. (The more customized the
good, the fewer the number of potential buyers and sellers and the less
liquid is the market, and hence [as we shall explain more fully in section
6.3] the less flexible the price.) Finally, there are enormous differences
across industries in degree of price flexibility.
In table 6.2 evidence is presented on the frequency of price rigidity for
two of the many types of transactions represented in table 6.1, annual and
monthly. Transactions were classified as monthly or annual according to
the buyer's reporting of the duration of the current agreement.
"Monthly" means that there is no negotiated understanding beyond the
current month, while "annual" means there is a contract that lasts for one
year. I will refer to these two types of transactions as monthly contracts
and annual contracts. Table 6.2 provides us with more detailed evidence
than table 6.1 on the flexibility of prices.
Many interesting facts emerge from an analysis of the data in table 6.2.
The contracting structures for each product are obviously different. A
curious finding is that there are many "annual" contracts whose prices
change well before one year has elapsed while there are many "monthly"
contracts whose prices often do not change for one year. The implication
seems to be that contract terms are obviously very flexible and adapta-
tions to sudden changes in market conditions are frequent. Ongoing
relations between buyer and seller probably account for this type of
behavior.
We expect the monthly contracts to represent purchases of less stable
buyers and therefore expect less reliance by a seller on his personal
knowledge of the buyer's needs to allocate goods and more reliance on
the price system. Table 6.2 confirms this view by showing that monthly
contract prices move more frequently than those for an annual contract.
This also establishes that there are contracts whose prices remain un-
changed at the same time that demand and supply forces are changing
other contract prices for the same general commodity. This confirms what
we had inferred earlier from table 6.1, namely that correlation of differ-
ent contract prices for the same general commodity need not be high.
It is possible to use the data of tables 6.1 and 6.2 to hazard some guesses
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Note: The numbers in the rows of the table may not add to one because of rounding.
aNote that "Number of Contracts" is not the number of spells of price rigidity in all
contracts. See the discussion preceding table 6.1 and footnote a of table 6.1.
ing the allocative role and which markets resemble illiquid markets with
fixed prices and quantity allocations performing the allocative role. Non-
ferrous metals, petroleum, and plywood seem likely to have submarkets
that are highly liquid (for these three categories, over 75% of monthly
contracts change price within three months), while steel, paper, and
chemicals seem likely to have submarkets that are highly illiquid (for
these markets, over 25% of the annual contracts change price less than
every year). It is very obvious from table 6.2 that for some goods there are
likely to be both highly liquid and highly illiquid submarkets. The highly
liquid submarket probably involves a more standardized variant of the
product than the illiquid submarket. The evidence of table 6.2 suggests
that both liquid and illiquid markets were significant factors in United
States manufacturing in the period 1957-66.144 Dennis W. Carlton
6.3 The Theory of Market Organization and Firm Structure
Every market economy must simultaneously solve the problems of
which type of goods to produce, how large and vertically integrated the
producing firms should be, and how sellers should transact with buyers.
Whether the transactions for a certain good take place in a liquid or
illiquid market will turn out to be a key factor in explaining the evidence
of the previous section and in understanding how inflation will affect a
particular market.
3
A requirement for a market to be liquid is that there be many potential
buyers and sellers at each moment. In order for markets to be liquid it is
often necessary for the quality attributes of the good to be very standard-
ized to assure that any two units of the good should be regarded as highly
intechangeable from a buyer's or a seller's point of view. This standard-
ization is designed to generate lots of potential buyers and sellers for the
product. (If goods are not standardized and not regarded as interchange-
able, then each transaction is unique and there can be no liquid market
for the product since there is no one product.) The advantage of a liquid
market is that it is easy (i.e. not costly) to transact quickly at the market
price. The disadvantage of a liquid market is the standardization of the
product. Each buyer will usually want some slightly different attributes in
the product. For example, if the buyers are other firms purchasing inputs,
the idiosyncratic nature of each buyer's production process might lead
each buyer to want a slightly different design of a particular machine.
There cannot be a liquid market for every single slightly different variety
of good—there would not be enough buyers and sellers to ensure the
liquidity of any of the markets.
There will therefore be a very close relation between how liquid
markets are and the variety of slightly different models of a product
produced. At one extreme, everyone uses a standardized product (e.g.
wheat futures) and a liquid market (e.g. Chicago Board of Trade for
wheat futures) can exist. (Whether the liquid market is an organized
exchange or not is not as important as whether it is highly liquid.) At the
other extreme, each buyer wants a uniquely designed product and no
liquid market can exist. In general, we expect to see demanders using the
liquid market to purchase the standardized goods for some of their needs
and using an illiquid market to contract forward to buy highly individual-
ized varieties of the good. As preferences shift from standardized to
custom designed products, the liquidity of the market for the standard-
ized good diminishes until eventually no liquid market remains. The
observed degree of product heterogeneity and market liquidity will be a
result of balancing the benefits from increased liquidity against the costs
of reduced product heterogeneity.145 Disruptive Effect of Inflation on the Organization of Markets
Liquid markets which determine the market price at which buyers and
sellers can always transact serve another valuable purpose in addition to
providing liquidity—they reveal the market price to both traders and
nontraders.
4 Suppose that the firm purchases a customized input on a
forward contract with a seller. Initially, competition among sellers
assures the buyer of a competitive price. However, as time progresses,
the seller who initially obtained the business may be in a position to exert
temporary monopoly power over the buyer, since he is the only seller
who can satisfy the buyer's needs quickly. How can a buyer ensure that
when the seller changes the price for the customized product the seller is
not exercising monopoly power? Alternatively, suppose a firm decides
not to use a standardized input product and instead decides to produce
the customized product itself—i.e. the firm vertically integrates. How can
the firm determine if its production division is producing the customized
input efficiently? The answer to both questions is that the firm can use the
price movements in the highly liquid market for the standardized product
to monitor the cost of either buying or producing the customized product.
Using the readily available price movements of the standardized product
will be a good way to monitor provided that the costs of producing the
standardized and customized products are highly correlated. The pres-
ence of a closely related liquid market makes it easier to transact in or
internally produce an illiquid good.
5
Whenever a product is sold in an illiquid market, setting the price
requires a negotiation between the buyer and seller. Since negotiations
are time-consuming and therefore costly, both the buyer and the seller
will not want to be always renegotiating the price.
6 (Even when there is a
closely related liquid market whose price can be used to index the
contract price in the illiquid market, it will still be the case [as long as the
relation between the liquid and illiquid market is not perfect—i.e. the
indexing is imperfect] that transacting in the illiquid market is more costly
than transacting in the liquid marked.) Therefore it is reasonable to
expect and the evidence presented earlier confirms that price (or the price
structure if there is [imperfect] indexing), once set, may not change for
some period of time. But if the price is unchanged over time, how do
goods, or more precisely, how does the sellers' productive capacity, get
allocated efficiently to buyers? The answer is that the price system is not
the sole mechanism used in the short run to allocate goods in illiquid
markets. It is possible to show that in a world of uncertainty with illiquid
markets it can be more efficient to use fixed price contracts combined
with quantity rationing than to use variable price contracts. The reason is
that in a liquid market, the market price is readily known while in an
illiquid market it is not. Any method of allocation has costs. Using prices
may be inefficient if the market price can only be guessed with error.146 Dennis W. Carlton
Quantity and price allocation may be preferable to pure price allocation
whenever sellers have very good knowledge of the relative needs of their
customers. (E.g. a supplier may know that two of his customers have
identical needs even though the supplier is unable to guess the market
clearing price.) In an illiquid market, the more homogeneous are the
needs of buyers and the greater is the variability in demand, the more
efficient is the price plus quantity allocation likely to be. Roughly speak-
ing, price is used to weed out those who generally want the good from
those who do not, while rationing (quantity allocations) is used to get the
good to those who need it most at each instant.
We have now outlined the relation between the existence of liquid and
illiquid markets, the variety of goods produced, the use of various con-
tractual arrangements, vertical integration, and price and quantity alloca-
tion mechanisms. In order to completely link the existence of markets to
the structure of firms, it is necessary to discuss firm size. Most economists
would agree that explanations of firm size based on production econo-
mies cannot convincingly explain the distribution of firm size across
industries. We focus on how the failure to have property rights in in-
formation plus the nonexistence of futures or spot markets explains the
size distribution of firms.
7
Suppose that an individual has special knowledge that the price of
wheat will rise. That individual can take advantage of his information by
buying long on the futures market for wheat. Futures markets enable
individuals to take advantage of any special information without having
to become a wheat dealer. Suppose that a futures market does not exist,
but a spot market does. Then, the individual with knowledge of a price
rise could become a wheat broker and earn a capital gain on his wheat.
The nonexistence of a futures market forces the individual to enter the
wheat business to take advantage of his information. (Taking advantage
of the information by investing in equity [i.e., common stocks] of wheat
firms or in firms that sell products whose price is affected by wheat prices
is likely to be less desirable than going into the wheat business because
the correlation of the wheat price with other [even closely related] prices
is not likely to be perfect.) Moreover, the special information the buyer
has about wheat prices may be derived from special knowledge about the
prices of specialized (illiquid) inputs used to produce wheat (e.g. special-
ized labor). In such a case, the efficient way to take advantage of the
information is not to become a broker middleman but rather to become a
wheat producer who utilizes inputs in the most efficient way.
When either organized futures or spot markets fail to exist, we can
expect the most informed firm to be a producer firm in the industry. The
firm earns a return on its information not through financial transactions
involving pieces of paper but through real transactions involving the
good. The firm takes advantage of its information by varying its output,147 Disruptive Effect of Inflation on the Organization of Markets
so we expect the best informed firm to have the most flexible production
technology of the firms in the industry.
8 Also, because of knowledge
about specialized input prices, we expect the most informed firm to be the
most vertically integrated firm in the industry.
This completes the sketch of a complicated set of interrelationships
between market organization and firm structure. The theory just outlined
is capable of explaining the evidence examined earlier and is necessary in
order to properly assess the disruptive effect inflation can have.
6.4 Effects of Inflation
Inflation is often defined to mean a general increase in all prices. That
definition fails to emphasize a key fact—namely that inflation increases
uncertainty. During inflation there is greater uncertainty about what
future price levels will be. Moreover, during inflation there is greater
uncertainty about relative prices (the price of one good relative to that of
another good). The view that completely separate forces determine
relative prices and the general price level is not valid on either theoretical
or empirical grounds. (See e.g. Cukierman 1979 for a theoretical discus-
sion, and Vining and Elwertowski 1976 and Parks 1978 for empirical
evidence showing that the variability of relative prices depends on in-
flationary conditions.)
What effect will this added uncertainty have? First, it will mean that it
is more difficult for firms to plan for the future since the added uncer-
tainty makes it more difficult to predict the future. Second, it will change
the relative advantages of liquid versus illiquid markets.
Recall from section 6.3 that the advantage of not using a highly liquid
market was that the buyer could custom design the product rather than
take delivery of a standardized product. The complication was that if a
buyer contracted with a seller for a customized product in an illiquid
market, it was hard to determine what the market price should be
especially after the contract had been entered into. The presence of a
liquid market with a market price always readily available for some
related product made it easier to transact in the illiquid good by enabling
the buyer to monitor the seller when the seller wished to alter price. If
inflation injects uncertainty into the price system, then it is likely to
become more difficult to use the price of a good sold in a liquid market to
estimate the marginal cost of the closely related good sold in the illiquid
market. Buyers in illiquid markets therefore will be less able to use the
market price of the liquid market to monitor their own contracts. In other
words, inflation degrades the information content of price in the liquid
market and makes it harder to transact in the illiquid market. (More
precisely, inflation causes the error in predicting real marginal cost to
rise.) Moreover, we saw earlier that to avoid the problem of continuous,148 Dennis W. Carlton
costly renegotiation, buyers and sellers prefer to have a fixed price (or
fixed price structure if there is indexing) for some time period. However,
sellers will be increasingly reluctant to give fixed price contracts (or
contracts in which the price is indexed to a product whose price is not
perfectly correlated with its own production costs) as price variability
increases. Therefore, since the relative advantage of using an illiquid
market decreases during inflation, we expect to see a shift away from
specialized goods sold in illiquid markets to more standardized goods sold
in liquid markets.
Even neglecting the renegotiation problem and the reluctance of sel-
lers to offer long-term fixed price contracts, we expect the use of illiquid
markets to diminish. Recall that in illiquid markets, quantity allocations
are based not only on price but on a seller's judgment as to which of his
customers needs the good the most. As inflation injects uncertainty into
the system, the judgments of the seller about the relative needs of
different buyers may become less accurate, so the method of allocating
goods by judgment becomes inefficient relative to the use of price alone.
An alternative that avoids the problems of renegotiation and the
reluctance of sellers to get locked into a fixed price (structure) is for the
buyer to produce the customized good internally. The difficulty with
internal production is that without a liquid market for a closely related
product, it may be difficult for the firm to easily monitor whether its
internal production costs are reasonable. If inflation injects uncertainty
into the economic system and lessens the ability to use the price in the
liquid market to predict the cost of the illiquid good, then vertical
integration becomes less desirable since monitoring becomes more dif-
ficult.
In summary, in response to inflationary uncertainty, we expect to see
fewer contracts with fixed prices for long time periods, fewer customized
goods, greater use of standardized goods sold in a liquid market, a move
from outside contracting of customized goods to internal production
through vertical integration, and a move from vertical integration to
reliance on standard quality goods sold in a liquid market where the
market price is easy to observe. All of these changes may be undesirable
from an efficiency standpoint.
9 Without inflation, the desired combina-
tion of liquidity and product diversity was achieved by balancing the
(private) benefits of diversity against the (private) costs of illiquidity.
Inflation injects uncertainty into the system, alters trade-offs, and causes
deviations from the initially desired combinations. It is unfortunately
very difficult to document whether the above predictions on the effect of
inflation reflect the experience of the United States economy in the 1970s.
No data source comparable to the one used to construct tables 6.1 and 6.2
is available. However, there have been reports of abandonment of fixed
price contracts in such commodities as paperboard, domestic copper, and
coal.149 Disruptive Effect of Inflation on the Organization of Markets
If inflation adds uncertainty to the economic system, we can expect
there to be a greater divergence in beliefs about future prices. This will
lead to an incentive to create markets for people to act on their beliefs
(Grossman 1977); hence we can expect futures markets to become more
prevalent. If a futures market already exists, we expect it to be used more
during inflationary times.
Table 6.3 shows the number of new futures markets that have been
established during the periods 1960-73 and 1974-78 on the major ex-
changes in the United States. The table supports the theory that the
average yearly rate of new contract introduction should be much higher
in the more recent inflationary period.
Another measure of the importance of futures contracts is the volume
of contracts traded. Table 6.4 presents evidence on futures contracts
traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (excluding the International
Monetary Market) and on grain futures contracts traded at major grain
exchanges.
Table 6.4 indicates a strong positive correlation between volume
traded and inflation, just as the theory predicts. Moreover, the recent
introduction and growth of financial futures since 1975 and the options
market since 1974 provides further support for the theory that the import-
ance of futures markets increases as inflation increases. My own prelimin-
ary econometric research suggests that holding crop size constant, an
unanticipated 1% change in the rate of inflation raises volume traded on
grain futures markets by about 1 to 5%.
The increase in the use of futures markets and liquid spot markets
should have a definite effect on the size of firms. Without liquid markets
in which it is easy to transact, it is necessary to become a member of the
Table 6.3 Introduction of New Futures Contracts and Inflation
1960-73 1974-78
Number of new futures contracts
introduced on the major U.S.
futures exchanges
3 95 50
Average yearly rate of introduction
of new futures contracts 6.8 10
Average rate of inflation (measured
by Dec. to Dec. changes in the CPI)
b 3.3 8.0
aI am grateful to John Labuszewski, formerly staff economist at the Chicago Board of Trade
and now director of economic research at the Mid-America Commodity Exchange, for
compiling these data using information from the Association of Commodity Exchange
Firms and "Ranking of Commodities/Market Share Report, Part I, 1979," an internal
CBOT memorandum.
bSource: Economic Report of the President, 1982, table B-55. Washington: Government











































aSource: Chicago Mercantile Exchange Yearbook, 1978, p. 6.
bExchanges included are Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago Open Board of Trade, Kansas
City Board of Trade, and Minneapolis Grain Exchange. Source: Chicago Board of Trade
Statistical Annual Report, 1978, p. 9.
'Source: Economic Report of the President, 1982, table B-55. Washington: Government
Printing Office.
industry in order to earn a return on superior information. As discussed
earlier, those firms with the best information are likely to be vertically
integrated, the most profitable, and the most flexible. However, with
well-organized spot and especially futures markets it is possible for
someone with superior information to earn a return on that information
without physically producing or, in the case of futures markets, storing
the good. The individual simply takes a position in the futures market or,
lacking a futures market, buys and sells on the spot market. Therefore, in
inflation we expect to see a rise in the number of liquid spot markets and
futures markets, a rise in the number of brokers (people who just buy and
sell) if only a spot market comes into existence, and perhaps a decrease in
the concentration of industry (because now a firm does not have to
produce to earn a return on its information). Once again, it is difficult to
use available data to test these hypotheses about inflation.
Inflation is not a uniform general increase in all prices that can be easily
handled by indexing all prices. Instead, inflation is a general increase in
prices accompanied by much uncertainty that disrupts the methods of
conducting business and alters the characteristics of goods that are pro-
duced. Inflation forces greater reliance on liquid markets—i.e. it forces
greater reliance on the price system to allocate relatively homogeneous
goods. What is important to recognize is that this move toward the simple
model of supply and demand may be undersir-able; (see note 9). The
greater reliance on the price system may represent a serious cost of
inflation. What the theory and the evidence outlined earlier tell us is that
it is sometimes better to have illiquid markets with customized products
than to have a liquid market with a homogeneous product. The efficiency151 Disruptive Effect of Inflation on the Organization of Markets
of an economic system is not measured by the liquidity of its markets, the
degree to which it uses price to allocate goods, or how closely the simple
supply equal to demand model predicts market behavior, but rather by
how well diverse consumer demands are satisfied. By injecting needless
uncertainty into the economic system, inflation may interfere with the
efficient methods of satisfying consumers and may impose substantial
costs on society by forcing consumers and business firms to use markets
they would not otherwise have used and to consume more standardized
products than they would otherwise have chosen. It is this disruption of
transaction, consumption, and production patterns that helps explain
why the public dislikes inflation.
Notes
1. Two noteworthy articles recognizing the effect of inflation on transaction costs are
Okun (1975) and Wachter and Williamson (1978). The spirit of my paper and its conclusions
are similar in many respects to those of Wachter and Williamson (1978).
2. I thank C. Freidland and G. Stigler for their help in explaining the data to me. See
Stigler and Kindahl (1970) for an analysis of these data.
3. See Telser and Higginbotham (1977) for a discussion of liquidity and its relation to
future markets.
4. The literature in finance examines this point in detail. See, for example, Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) and the references cited therein. Also, see Kitch (1980).
5. Will the optimal number of liquid and illiquid markets be established by private
market forces? The answer appears to be no. Liquidity generates a positive externality for
which no compensation is necessarily received.
6. See Wachter and Williamson (1978).
7. See Kitch (1980) for an interesting discussion on this point. See also Carlton (1980).
8. See Carlton (1982).
9. As section 6.2 (see note 5) pointed out, there is an externality associated with the
existence of liquid markets. The theory of second best, applied to the problem under study,
shows that it will be difficult, theoretically, to make unambigious welfare statements about
inflation. Only statements about private (not social) benefits and costs are possible. Because
of the second-best problem, the analysis implies that a zero rate of inflation is not likely to be
socially optimal. However, it seems clear that as the rate of inflation increases, the increased
private costs of inflation identified in this paper can eventually overwhelm second-best
considerations. Therefore the effect of inflation on the organization of markets and transac-
tions does represent a potential cost to society and is a cost that analysts should be aware of.
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